USA v. Marcus Walker by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-5-2021 
USA v. Marcus Walker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Marcus Walker" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 222. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/222 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










 MARCUS WALKER, 
 
                  Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 2-13-cr-00391-002) 




October 5, 2020 
 
Before:   JORDAN, KRAUSE, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 




Linda D. Hoffa   [ARGUED] 
Dilworth Paxson 
1500 Market Street – Suite 3500E 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Bernadette A. McKeon 
Yvonne O. Osirim 
Virginia P. Pratter 
Robert A. Zauzmer   [ARGUED] 
Office of United States Attorney  
615 Chestnut Street – Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
          Counsel for Appellee 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Does an attempt to commit a crime of violence 
categorically qualify as a crime of violence itself?  That is the 
question we must answer in applying 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), 
which forbids the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a 
crime of violence.  Given the language of § 924(c) and the clear 
congressional intent behind it, we answer yes: an attempt to 
commit a crime of violence does categorically qualify as a 
crime of violence under that statute.   
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 Appellant Marcus Walker challenges his conviction 
under § 924(c), as well as his convictions for conspiracy to 
commit Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).  Although we earlier issued 
a nonprecedential opinion affirming the District Court’s 
judgment on all grounds, we vacated that opinion and granted 
Walker’s request for panel rehearing following the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 
(2019), which, in pertinent part, held that one of the definitions 
of “crime of violence” in § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague.  
Id. at 2336.   
 
 In light of Davis, the most significant questions 
remaining before us are whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery 
is categorically a crime of violence under the remaining 
definition, the so-called “elements” clause of § 924(c), 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), and therefore, whether Walker’s 
conviction under § 924(c) can stand.  Walker argues that his 
conviction must be vacated because a person can be convicted 
for attempted Hobbs Act robbery based on nothing more than 
an intent to complete the robbery and a non-violent substantial 
step – in other words, without actually committing a violent act 
and with only the intent to do so.  Although that is true, we 
nevertheless join the majority of our sister circuits that have 
considered the issue and hold that, given the plain language of 
§ 924(c), attempted Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a crime 
of violence.  We also once more reject Walker’s complaints 
about evidentiary rulings and the jury instructions.  In short, 
we again affirm.   
4 
I. BACKGROUND 
This case stems from a robbery in which Walker acted 
as the lookout.1  While he waited in a car, two of his 
accomplices robbed a house, one holding a 12-year-old boy at 
gunpoint.  All of Walker’s codefendants pleaded guilty to 
various counts, and Walker alone went to trial.   
 
At trial, the government presented testimony from three 
cooperating individuals who were involved in or knew about 
the robbery, as well as from Agent Patrick Henning, the lead 
investigator on the case.  In addition to testifying about proffer 
sessions he had with two of the cooperating witnesses, 
Henning spoke at length about cell phone records and cell site 
location information (“CSLI”) associated with cell phones 
used in furtherance of the crimes.2   
 
With respect to the cell phone records, Henning testified 
that an analyst extracted data from cell phones seized from two 
of the cooperators, which yielded contact lists, call records, and 
text messages.  In addition, the government obtained through 
 
 1 Although Walker waited in the car to act as a lookout, 
the government presented evidence that Walker organized the 
robbery – gathering the other robbers, suggesting the target, 
and urging entry into the house although someone was home.   
 
 
2 CSLI identifies the cell towers to which a cell phone 
connects at certain times, allowing the government to 
determine the cell phone’s approximate location at the times of 
connection.  See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 
2211-12 (2018).  
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subpoena “call detail records” from the phone companies for 
those same phones, which included “pages and pages of phone 
records that list, with timestamps, calls that are made in 
sequential order[,]” as well as subscriber information.  (App. at 
686.)  From this information, Henning and an analyst 
organized certain data into slides depicting phone contacts 
between codefendants during the relevant time frame.    
 
The CSLI evidence was obtained pursuant to a court 
order, issued under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703.3  With that information in hand, Henning created a 
series of maps that identified “points of interest” in the case, 
such as the location of the robbery target and the latitude and 
longitude of the cell towers to which Walker’s and a 
codefendant’s cell phones had connected at pertinent times.  
(App. at 707.)  When asked how CSLI worked, Henning 
explained what he knew, but he began by acknowledging that 
he is not an expert in the technology.  Defense counsel 
promptly objected on the ground that Henning was not an 
expert witness.4  At side bar, the parties agreed that “just 
 
 
3 Section 2703 authorizes courts to order cell phone 
providers to disclose non-content information if the 
government “offers specific and articulable facts showing that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that … the records or 
other information sought, are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B), 
(d).   
 
 
4 Defense counsel did not object when Henning 
explained, only moments before, that “[t]his data is cell tower 
locations, it’s where the phones that the men in this robbery 
were using, where these phones were communicating, which 
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transposing [onto a map] the latitude and longitude” of a cell 
phone tower to which a phone had connected – information 
provided by the phone companies – did not require expert 
analysis, and the District Court allowed Henning to proceed.  
(App. at 710-11.)  Henning went on to explain how the CSLI 
placed Walker and an accomplice in locations that were 
consistent with their involvement in the robbery.   
 
The jury convicted Walker on all three counts, those 
counts being, again, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), attempted Hobbs Act 
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and using and 
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  The District Court 
sentenced him to a combined 72 months’ imprisonment on the 
conspiracy and attempt counts and a consecutive term of 60 
months on the § 924(c) count.   
 
Walker timely appealed, arguing that the District Court 
erred in four ways: (1) admitting CSLI obtained without a 
search warrant as required by Carpenter v. United States, 138 
S. Ct. 2206 (2018); (2) permitting Agent Henning to vouch for 
cooperating witnesses’ testimony and to violate the Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation by testifying to information 
in a report Henning did not create; (3) allowing conviction on 
the § 924(c) count when, according to Walker, neither 
conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery nor attempted Hobbs 
Act robbery are categorically crimes of violence under 
§ 924(c); and (4) allowing the § 924(c) conviction despite 
ambiguity as to whether the jury relied on attempted robbery 
 
towers they were communicating with at certain parts—certain 
parts of certain days.”  (App. at 706.) 
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or conspiracy to commit robbery as the predicate crime of 
violence.  
 
As already noted, we had issued a nonprecedential 
opinion affirming the District Court’s judgment and the 
sentence it imposed, but following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Davis, Walker filed a petition for panel rehearing 
or for rehearing en banc.  He argued that Davis abrogates 
United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2016), a case 
we had relied upon in denying him relief in the earlier appeal 
of his § 924(c) conviction.  We agreed that Robinson is no 
longer controlling and granted his petition for panel rehearing.  
Having vacated the original opinion and judgment, we now 
address all four of Walker’s arguments again.  
 
II. DISCUSSION5 
A. Admissibility of the CSLI 
 We first consider the arguments related to CSLI.  
Walker’s primary argument begins with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Carpenter v. United States.  In Carpenter, the Court 
 
 5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§  231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because 
Walker raises these issues for the first time on appeal, we 
review for plain error.  United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 
223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Under the plain error standard, the 
defendant must show that there was (1) an actual error, (2) that 
is plain, (3) that affects the complaining party’s “substantial 
rights,” and (4) that “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-36 (1993) (citations omitted). 
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held that compliance with the Stored Communications Act 
alone is not sufficient to legally access historical cell-site 
records because the showing required of the government by the 
Stored Communications Act “falls well short of the probable 
cause required for a warrant.”  138 S. Ct. at 2221.  According 
to Walker, the District Court thus plainly erred when it allowed 
the government to introduce CSLI obtained without a warrant.  
Although it is now true that law enforcement must generally 
secure a search warrant based on probable cause to obtain 
CSLI, see id., Walker’s argument is foreclosed by our decision 
in United States v. Goldstein, which holds that the exclusionary 
rule does not apply when the government “had an objectively 
reasonable good faith belief that its conduct was legal when it 
acquired [the] CSLI.”  914 F.3d 200, 202 (3d Cir. 2019).  As 
in Goldstein, the agents here obtained the CSLI evidence in 
good faith reliance on a then-valid judicial order, a then-valid 
statute, and then-binding appellate authority.  See id. at 204.  
The District Court, therefore, did not commit any error, much 
less plain error, by admitting the CSLI into evidence. 
 
B. Agent Henning’s Testimony 
 Walker next argues that the District Court committed 
plain error by permitting Henning to testify about the phone 
records and CSLI because that testimony was based on a report 
Henning did not create and therefore the testimony violated 
Walker’s Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth 
Amendment.  Walker also argues that Henning improperly 
vouched for the testimony of the cooperating witnesses.   
 
 The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]”  U.S. Const. 
9 
amend. VI.  It generally bars “admission of testimonial 
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he 
was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”  Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). 
 
 Although Walker asserts that Henning was testifying 
about what another investigator did, it is at least arguable that 
he was speaking about his own work.  The record contains 
evidence that Henning personally reviewed the data at issue, 
even though he worked “[i]n conjunction with an … analyst.”  
(App. at 695.)6  Thus, it appears that Henning had an 
independent basis on which to testify about both the phone 
 
 
6  See also App. at 708 (“Q: What did you do with the 
cell site data?  A: I reviewed … the information from the phone 
companies[.]  I was able to see cell site latitude and longitude 
locations, which I can just go right into a Google Maps, for 
example, put in those points and see where those towers 
were.”); 722 (“Q: All right.  Now here we have the longer list 
of calls.  Let’s, could you please explain now what this slide 
represents, looks -- represents in total?  A: Yes.  I essentially 
went through each day beginning July 1st all the way until July 
13th, and I looked at the records that I received from AT&T 
for Marcus -- Marcus Walker’s phone to see when his first 
phone call was essentially being made each morning and to see 
where, which tower it was hitting off of.  And consistently 
every single day in the morning when his phone call or when 
his phone was being activated or being used, it was hit -- hitting 




records and the CSLI.7  Cf. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 
U.S. 647, 662 (2011) (finding relevant to its conclusion that a 
Confrontation-Clause violation occurred that the State did not 
contend that the testifying analyst – who did not perform the 
lab test at issue – had an “independent opinion” concerning the 
test results (citation omitted)). 
 
 Assuming, however, that there was some 
Confrontation-Clause error in permitting Henning’s testimony 
about those matters, it was not plain.  There is no consensus 
concerning the proper bounds of the Confrontation Clause 
when multiple people collaborate to make a testimonial 
statement.8  What little law there is supports the government’s 
contention that the testimony Henning proffered was 
permissible.  See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 672-73 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring in part) (noting that it was “not a case in which 
the person testifying [was] a supervisor, reviewer, or someone 
else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the 
 
 7 See App. at 774 (“THE COURT: This was done in 
your presence, right, the work of the analyst, lest suggesting 
that - - AGENT HENNING: Yes, this was a collaborative 
effort.”). 
 
 8 The Supreme Court’s Confrontation-Clause 
jurisprudence does not set entirely clear boundaries.  See Stuart 
v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36, 36 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting 
from denial of writ of certiorari) (observing that “[t]his Court’s 
most recent foray in [Confrontation-Clause jurisprudence 
relating to forensic testing], Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 
(2012), yielded no majority and its various opinions have sown 
confusion in courts across the country.”). 
 
11 
[testimonial statement] at issue”); Grim v. Fisher, 816 F.3d 
296, 307 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[A]t most, Bullcoming holds that if 
scientist A performed the test, the prosecution cannot prove a 
particular fact contained in scientist A’s testimonial 
certification by offering the in-court testimony of scientist B, 
if scientist B neither signed the certification nor performed or 
observed the test.  But Bullcoming does not hold that scientist 
B cannot testify even if he has a sufficient degree of 
involvement with the forensic testing.”); Meras v. Sisto, 676 
F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2012) (Bea, J., concurring in part) 
(“Bullcoming did ‘not address what degree of involvement 
[with a report’s preparation] is sufficient’ to allow a supervisor 
to testify in place of the primary author, but [the supervisor] 
may have had enough involvement here to satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause.” (citation omitted)).  The claim of error 
is especially weak in this case, given the parties’ agreement 
that the records themselves were admissible.9   
 
 9 In addition, it is not obvious to us, and Walker has not 
described, how the alleged error affected his substantial rights.  
See United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 78-79 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(rejecting a Confrontation Clause challenge where admission 
of the evidence “simply had no effect on the verdict”).  Three 
cooperating witnesses testified that Walker participated in the 
robbery.  The defense engaged in a lengthy cross-examination 
of Henning and did not challenge the accuracy of the data 
reflected on his slides or cite any discrepancies between the 
phone record exhibits and the underlying records.  Thus, even 
though the phone records and CSLI were corroborating 
evidence, Walker has not shown a deprivation of substantial 
rights on plain-error review. 
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 Walker’s vouching argument also fails.  Vouching 
occurs when a prosecutor, or testimony elicited by a 
prosecutor, (1) “assure[s] the jury that the testimony of a 
Government witness is credible, and (2) this assurance [is] 
based on either the prosecutor’s personal knowledge, or other 
information not contained in the record.”  United States v. 
Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 133-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  Bolstering witness 
testimony in that way is forbidden, id., and would be a problem 
here if Henning’s testimony did what Walker claims.  But it 
did not.  
 
 There is no sensible vouching challenge to be made 
because Henning’s testimony did not “invite[] a plausible jury 
inference of extra-record proof of reliability[.]”  United States 
v. Milan, 304 F.3d 273, 290 (3d Cir. 2002).  After the 
cooperators themselves had testified and been cross-examined 
about their version of the events, Henning testified about his 
interviews with them and the cell phone data that he analyzed, 
confirming that the cell phone data was “consistent with [his] 
investigation[,]” that is, consistent with what the jury heard 
about the various locations related to the robbery.  (App. at 
731-32.)  Because Henning’s testimony cannot fairly be 
interpreted as improperly bolstering the credibility of the 
cooperators through information not in the record, Walker’s 
vouching argument fails.  See Milan, 304 F.3d at 290 (finding 
no plain error where the defendant failed “to show that the 
prosecutors referred to facts not adduced at trial or offered 




C. Attempted Hobbs Act Robbery as Predicate 
for § 924(c) Conviction10 
Walker next argues that, after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Davis, attempted Hobbs Act robbery cannot serve 
as a valid predicate crime of violence under the elements clause 
of § 924(c).  We disagree.   
 
Prior to Davis, there were two statutory avenues 
available for determining an offense to be a crime of violence 
under § 924(c): either through what is called the “residual” 
clause or through the elements clause of the statute.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(3).  The residual clause defines a “crime of violence” 
as “an offense that is a felony and – that by its nature, involves 
a substantial risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of committing 
the offense.”  Id. § 924(c)(3)(B).  In Davis, however, the 
Supreme Court held that language to be unconstitutionally 
 
 10 Because the jury instructions make clear that the 
predicate crime for Walker’s § 924(c) conviction was 
attempted Hobbs Act robbery (see infra section II.D.), we do 
not need to consider whether conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act 
robbery is categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c).  
We note, however, the government’s concession that “Walker 
correctly observes that the government, and several appellate 
courts, have acknowledged after Davis that a conspiracy crime 
is not a proper 924(c) predicate under the elements clause.”  
(Appellee Sept. 2019 Suppl. Ltr. at 2.)  See, e.g., United States 
v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. 
Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. 
Lewis, 907 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir. 2018). 
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vague.  Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2336.  Accordingly, an offense is 
now a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the statute 
only if it meets the definition contained in the elements clause, 
§ 924(c)(3)(A).  That clause defines a “crime of violence” as 
“an offense that is a felony and – has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 
person or property of another.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). 
 
The Supreme Court in Davis also indicated that the 
categorical approach is to be used when deciding whether a 
conviction is a crime of violence under the elements clause.  
Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2328.  We accordingly must ask whether 
the minimum conduct punishable as attempted Hobbs Act 
robbery qualifies as a crime of violence.  See Moncrieffe v. 
Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190-91 (2013) (explaining that, under 
the categorical approach, we “presume that the conviction 
rested upon nothing more than the least of the act criminalized, 
and then determine whether even those acts are encompassed 
by the generic federal [definition of § 924(c)]” (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
Our sister courts of appeals are split on the answer to 
that question.  The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
have all held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is categorically 
a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c).  
United States v. Dominguez, 954 F.3d 1251, 1261 (9th Cir. 
2020); United States v. Ingram, 947 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (7th 
Cir. 2020); United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335, 351-53 
(11th Cir. 2018), abrogated in part on other grounds by Davis, 
139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019); see United States v. Smith, 957 F.3d 
590, 596 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that an “attempt offense that 
includes the specific intention to commit a COV [“crime of 
violence”] and a substantial step in an effort to bring about or 
15 
accomplish that COV, is in and of itself a COV under the 
elements clause.”).  The Fourth Circuit disagreed, however, 
and recently adopted the position expressed in some dissenting 
opinions from those other courts, holding that attempted Hobbs 
Act robbery is not categorically a crime of violence.  United 
States v. Taylor, 979 F.3d 203, 209-10  (4th Cir. 2020); see also 
United States v. Tucker, No. 18-0119, 2020 WL 93951, at *6 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2020) (“[T]his Court concurs with 
[dissenting] judges of the 11th Circuit that, ‘it is incorrect to 
say that a person necessarily attempts to use physical force 
within the meaning of 924(c)’s elements clause just because he 
attempts a crime that, if completed would be violent.’” (citation 
omitted)).  Given the statutory language and the clear 
congressional intent behind it, we join the courts that hold 
attempted Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a crime of 
violence.  
 
1. Completed Hobbs Act Robbery 
Our reasoning begins with a consideration of whether 
Hobbs Act robbery as a completed act, rather than an attempt, 
is categorically a crime of violence.  The Hobbs Act defines 
“robbery” as:  
 
the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal 
property from the person or in the presence of 
another, against his will, by means of actual or 
threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, 
immediate or future, to his person or property, or 
property in his custody or possession, or the 
person or property of a relative or member of his 
family or of anyone in his company at the time 
of the taking or obtaining. 
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18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1).  Every court of appeals to consider the 
issue has held that Hobbs Act robbery is indeed a crime of 
violence for purposes of § 924(c),11 and we agree.  Although 
we have no binding precedent of our own on this issue, a 
concurring opinion in United States v. Robinson concluded that 
“Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a crime of violence under 
Section 924(c)(3).”  844 F.3d 137, 151 (3d Cir. 2016) (Fuentes, 
J., concurring).  The opinion reasoned that, because the 
Supreme Court has defined “physical force” to be simply 
“force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another 
person,” all the alternative means of committing a Hobbs Act 
robbery – actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of 
injury – can satisfy § 924(c)(3)(A)’s requirement of “use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force[.]”  Id. 
(citations omitted).  In other words, “by definition, a jury could 
have found ‘actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of 
injury’ only if the defendant used, attempted to use, or 
threatened to use physical force because ‘fear of injury’ cannot 
occur without at least a threat of physical force, and vice 
versa.”  Id.   
 
 11 See United States v. Dominguez, 954 F.3d 1251, 1261 
(9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 266 (4th 
Cir. 2019); United States v. Jones, 919 F.3d 1064, 1072 (8th 
Cir. 2019); United States v. Garcia-Ortiz, 904 F.3d 102, 106-
09 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v. Melgar-Cabrera, 892 F.3d 
1053, 1060-66 (10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 
51, 60 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Fox, 878 F.3d 574, 579 
(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Gooch, 850 F.3d 285, 292 (6th 
Cir. 2017); United States v. Buck, 847 F.3d 267, 275-76 (5th 
Cir. 2017); In re St. Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 
2016). 
17 
 The concurrence further noted that “Congress 
specifically singled out the federal bank robbery statute as a 
crime that is the prototypical ‘crime of violence’ captured by 
Section 924(c).  Yet, the federal bank robbery statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 2113(a), is analogous to Hobbs Act robbery.”  Id. at 
151 n.28 (citing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 312-13 (1983)) (other 
citation omitted).  Both involve force, violence, or 
intimidation, described in various ways, from which “we can 
surmise that Congress intended the ‘physical force’ element to 
be satisfied by intimidation or, analogously, fear of injury.”  Id.   
 
 That analysis is thoroughly persuasive, but Walker 
disputes it.  He argues that Hobbs Act robbery cannot be a 
crime of violence because it can be completed by taking money 
from a victim “through fear of injury to the victim’s intangible 
property” without the use or threatened use of force.  
(Appellant Dec. 2020 Suppl. Ltr. at 3.)  Not so.   
 
The history of the Hobbs Act makes clear that a physical 
act is a key component of Hobbs Act robbery.  We long ago 
explained why in United States v. Nedley, 255 F.2d 350 (3d 
Cir. 1958).  During the promulgation of the Hobbs Act, 
Representative Sam Hobbs of Alabama and several other 
members of Congress confirmed that the terms “robbery” and 
“extortion” in the Act were based on the then-existing New 
York penal laws, which defined robbery consistently with the 
common law definition of that crime.  Id. at 355-56.  “The 
legislative debates are replete with statements that the conduct 
punishable under the Hobbs Act was already punishable under 
state robbery and extortion statutes.”  United States v. Culbert, 
435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978) (citations omitted).  And because 
“[r]obbery, at common law, is the felonious and forcible taking 
from the person of another of goods or money to any value by 
18 
violence or putting him in fear[,]”  Nedley, 255 F.2d at 356 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), it follows that 
a non-forcible taking based on fear of injury to intangible 
property would not be sufficient to satisfy the force 
requirement of Hobbs Act robbery, since Hobbs Act robbery is 
simply a common law robbery that affects interstate 
commerce.12    
 
Therefore, consistent with the reasoning in the 
concurrence in Robinson and with the position taken by our 
 
 12 Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales 
v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007), the First and 
Ninth Circuits have similarly held that a hypothetical robbery 
involving intangible economic interests does not eliminate 
Hobbs Act robbery as a crime of violence under § 924(c) 
“because [the defendant] fails to point to any realistic scenario 
in which a robber could commit Hobbs Act robbery by placing 
his victim in fear of injury to an intangible economic interest.”  
Dominguez, 954 F.3d at 1260; see also Garcia-Ortiz, 904 F.3d 
at 107 (rejecting the argument that Hobbs Act robbery can be 
committed by threatening to devalue some intangible 
economic interest because “we need not consider a theorized 
scenario unless there is a ‘realistic probability’ that courts 
would apply the law to find an offense in such a scenario”).  
We reach the same conclusion without reliance on the realistic-
probability inquiry.  See Salmoran v. Att’y Gen., 909 F.3d 73, 
81 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[W]here the elements of the crime of 
conviction are not the same as the elements of the generic 
federal offense ... the realistic probability inquiry ... is simply 
not meant to apply[.]” (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).   
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sister circuits, we conclude that completed Hobbs Act robbery 
necessarily has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property 
of another and is therefore categorically a crime of violence.  
 
2. Attempted Hobbs Act Robbery 
  With that in mind, we turn to a consideration of 
attempted Hobbs Act robbery and note at the outset the general 
definition of attempt offenses.  “[A]n attempt conviction 
requires evidence that a defendant (1) acted with the requisite 
intent to violate the statute, and (2) performed an act that, under 
the circumstances as he believes them to be, constitutes a 
substantial step in the commission of the crime.”  United States 
v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 469 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation 
omitted).  The elements clause of § 924(c) describes a crime of 
violence as including the attempted use of force.  More 
specifically, it says a crime of violence is “an offense that is a 
felony and – has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property 
of another[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).  As 
the government points out, “[t]he Eleventh Circuit and other 
courts of appeals have persuasively held that an attempt to 
commit a crime that requires the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force is itself a ‘crime of violence’ 
under Section 924(c)(3)(A) and similarly worded elements 
clause provisions.”  (Appellee Sept. 2019 Suppl. Ltr. at 2.)  Put 
simply, those courts hold that, because § 924(c) explicitly 
includes “attempted use” of physical force in the definition of 
a crime of violence, a conviction for attempt to commit a crime 
of violence is necessarily sufficient to serve as a predicate 
under § 924(c).  There is, however, a contrary view, and so, to 
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explain our own reasoning, we first lay out the competing 
arguments from other courts.   
 
 The view that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is 
categorically a crime of violence begins with the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Hill v. United States, 877 F.3d 717, 719 
(7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 352 (2018). The court 
in Hill considered whether a defendant’s conviction for 
attempted murder qualified as a violent felony under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).  Id. at 718.  Similar to 
§ 924(c), the ACCA has an elements clause that labels a violent 
felony as one that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another[.]”  Id.   
 
 The defendant in Hill argued that, because an attempt 
crime under Illinois law consists of setting out to commit a 
crime and taking a substantial step toward accomplishing that 
end, it is possible to attempt murder without using, attempting, 
or threatening physical force.  Id. at 719.  One might, for 
example, draw up assassination plans and buy a gun without 
any actual use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force.  The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument, holding 
that, “[w]hen a substantive offense would be a violent felony 
under [the ACCA] and similar statutes, an attempt to commit 
that offense also is a violent felony.”  Id.  The court declared 
that “an attempt to commit a crime should be treated as an 
attempt to commit every element of that crime[.]”  Id.  Later, 
in United States v. Ingram, the Seventh Circuit applied the 
holding from Hill to conclude that attempted Hobbs Act 
robbery is, for purposes of § 924(c), categorically a crime of 
violence.  947 F.3d at 1026. 
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 In the meantime, the Eleventh Circuit also applied the 
reasoning from Hill to a § 924(c) case.  In United States v. St. 
Hubert, the court concluded that, like completed Hobbs Act 
robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of 
violence.  The court said that “because the taking of property 
from a person against his will in the forcible manner required 
by [the Hobbs Act] necessarily includes the use, attempted use, 
or threatened use of physical force, then by extension the 
attempted taking of such property from a person in the same 
forcible manner must also include at least the ‘attempted use’ 
of force.”  909 F.3d at 351 (citations omitted).  
 
When the Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing en banc in 
St. Hubert, a dissent challenged the reasoning adopted from 
Hill.  United States v. St. Hubert, 918 F.3d 1174, 1210 (11th 
Cir. 2019) (Pryor, Jill, J. joined by Wilson and Martin, JJ., 
dissenting) (hereinafter “St. Hubert II”).  That dissent rejected 
the conclusion that an attempt to commit a crime should be 
treated as an attempt to commit every element of that crime, 
saying instead that “[i]ntending to commit each element of a 
crime involving the use of force simply is not the same as 
attempting to commit each element of that crime.”  Id. at 1212.  
According to the dissent, it is incorrect to say that a person 
necessarily attempts to use physical force within the meaning 
of § 924(c) just because he attempts a crime that, if completed, 
would involve force.  Id.   
 
The Ninth Circuit soon thereafter in United States v. 
Dominguez sided with the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits in 
holding that, when a substantive offense would be a crime of 
violence under § 924(c), an attempt to commit that offense is 
also a crime of violence.  954 F.3d at 1261.  It said that the 
“reasons for this are straightforward” because § 924(c) 
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“explicitly includes as crimes of violence offenses that have as 
an element the ‘attempted use’ or ‘threatened use’ of force.  In 
order to be guilty of attempt, a defendant must intend to 
commit every element of the completed crime. …  An attempt 
to commit a crime should therefore be treated as an attempt to 
commit every element of that crime.”  Id. (citations omitted).13  
The Fifth Circuit also agreed, adopting the same reasoning in 
United States v. Smith and holding that a predicate attempt 
offense that includes the specific intention to commit a crime 
of violence and a substantial step to bring about or accomplish 
that crime of violence, “is in and of itself a [crime of violence] 
under the elements clause.”  957 F.3d at 596. 
 
Finally, and most recently, the Fourth Circuit split from 
the consensus and adopted the dissenting view, holding that 
“[w]here a defendant takes a nonviolent substantial step toward 
threatening to use physical force … the defendant has not used, 
attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force.  Rather, 
the defendant has merely attempted to threaten to use physical 
 
 13 Reiterating the concerns of the Eleventh Circuit 
dissent, a dissenting opinion in Dominguez challenged the 
majority’s conclusion that an attempt to commit a crime should 
be treated as an attempt to commit every element of that crime.  
954 F.3d at 1264 (Nguyen, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  It argued that the majority’s conclusion “doesn’t 
follow as a matter of law or logic.  There is no legal basis to 
conclude from an attempt conviction that the defendant 
attempted to commit every element of the underlying crime.  
And there’s a logical gap: the majority conflates attempt and 
intent.  Only by substituting ‘intended’ for ‘attempted’ does the 
majority’s analysis make sense.”  Id.  
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force.  The plain text of § 924(c)(3)(A) does not cover such 
conduct.”  Taylor, 979 F.3d at 208.   
 
In the present case, Walker of course urges us to reject 
the reasoning of the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits and instead adopt the approach taken by the Fourth 
Circuit.  Specifically, he argues that attempted Hobbs Act 
robbery is not a crime of violence because “it does not 
categorically require the attempted use of physical force—
much less the use or threatened use of physical force—against 
the person or property of another.”  (Appellant Sept. 2019 
Suppl. Ltr. at 2.)  Quoting the dissent in St. Hubert II, he says 
that “[i]ntending to commit each element of a crime involving 
the use of force simply is not the same as attempting to commit 
each element of that crime.”  (Id. at 3.)  Finally, he argues that 
attempted Hobbs Act robbery cannot categorically be a crime 
of violence because a person can be convicted of Hobbs Act 
robbery based on an empty threat of force.  It is possible, he 
says, for a person “with no intention of using ‘actual’ force” to 
be convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery.  (Id. at 4.)    
 
Although it is true that an intent to act is not the 
equivalent of an attempt to act, we nevertheless are 
unpersuaded by Walker’s arguments and instead agree with the 
majority of courts of appeals that § 924(c) does categorically 
encompass attempted Hobbs Act robbery.  We think it apparent 
that Congress meant for all attempted crimes of violence to be 
captured by the elements clause of § 924(c), and courts are not 
free to disregard that direction and hold otherwise.   
 
Beginning with the language of the statute, we read the 
phrase “has as an element the … attempted use … of physical 
force” to capture attempt offenses because the word “attempt” 
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is a term of art in criminal law that attaches liability to an 
incomplete crime when “the perpetrator not only intended to 
commit the completed offense, but also performed …. an 
‘overt act’ that constitutes a ‘substantial step’ toward 
completing the offense.”  United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 
U.S. 102, 106-07 (2007) (citations omitted).  The word is not 
used in the general sense of something unsuccessfully tried.  To 
hold that attempt crimes are beyond the reach of § 924(c) based 
on a generic definition of “attempt” would be to disregard how 
that word has been “used in the law for centuries.”14  Id. at 107; 
see id. at 108 n.4 (concluding that an indictment charging an 
 
 14 The dissent to the Ninth Circuit’s Dominguez opinion 
argued that an attempted use of force under § 924(c) “refers to 
a defendant’s physical act of trying (but failing) to use violent 
physical force” (i.e., generic attempt versus attempt as an 
offense).  Dominguez, 954 F.3d at 1264 (Nguyen, J., dissenting 
in part).  According to that dissent, because the other two 
qualifying elements – using and threatening to use force – 
obviously refer to acts, we must interpret “attempted use” 
similarly under the principle of noscitur a sociis, or 
interpreting an ambiguous item in a list to possess the same 
attribute as its companion items in that list.  Id.  But unlike “use 
of force” and “threatened use of force,” we can find no crime 
that has attempted use of force as an element of a completed 
offense.  As the name suggests, the crimes that turn on 
attempted acts of force are in fact attempt offenses.  Cf. United 
States v. Jackson, 964 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(“[A]ccording to the ‘anti-surplusage’ canon, ‘[i]t is our duty 
to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a 
statute.’” (second alteration in original) (citing Duncan v. 
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, (2001)). 
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attempt crime need not specifically allege a particular overt act 
because “we think that the ‘substantial step’ requirement is 
implicit in the word ‘attempt’”); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 
478, 483 (1990) (“But where a phrase in a statute appears to 
have become a term of art … any attempt to break down the 
term into its constituent words is not apt to illuminate its 
meaning.”); cf. United States v. Nasir,  982 F.3d 144, 159 (3d 
Cir. 2020) (en banc) (noting that the similar definition of crime 
of violence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
§ 4B1.2(a) does explicitly include inchoate crimes).  To give 
the word “attempt” its due, we think it best read in its technical 
sense.  
 
The manner in which federal attempt crimes are 
typically defined further supports that reading.  Rather than 
rely on a general statute outlawing all attempts to violate 
federal criminal law, Congress has chosen to interweave 
prohibitions on attempted crimes within the statutes defining 
the underlying substantive offenses.15  In those statutes, it is 
 
 15 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(f)(1) (destruction of U.S. 
property) (“Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or 
attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an 
explosive, [U.S. property,] ... shall be imprisoned for not less 
than 5 years and not more than 20 years, fined under this title, 
or both.”); 1951(a) (robbery and extortion) (“Whoever in any 
way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the 
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by 
robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do … shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty 
years, or both.”);  1956(a)(1) (money laundering) (“Whoever 
... conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction 
... shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 ... or 
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clear that the words “attempts to” authorize the prosecution of 
attempt offenses.  We similarly read the words “attempted use” 
in the elements clause of § 924(c) to capture attempt offenses.  
Again, to hold that attempted crimes of violence are not 
categorically crimes of violence themselves would ignore the 
time-tested meaning of “attempt” as used throughout the 
criminal code.  Even in the odd realm of the categorical 
approach, “we shall not read into the statute a definition … so 
obviously ill suited to its purposes.”  Taylor v. United States, 
495 U.S. 575, 594 (1990). 
 
Our own prior interpretations of congressional intent 
further support the conclusion that attempted crimes of 
violence qualify as crimes of violence themselves.  Section 
924(c) assures additional punishment for those who create 
heightened risk or cause additional harm through the 
possession or use of a firearm in connection with a crime of 
violence or a drug trafficking offense.  We have recognized 
that “Congress’s ‘overriding purpose’ in passing Section 
924(c) ‘was to combat the increasing use of guns to commit 
federal felonies.’ … The chief sponsor of this provision 
explained that ‘the provision seeks to persuade the man who is 
tempted to commit a Federal felony to leave his gun at home.’”  
United States v. Walker, 473 F.3d 71, 78 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 




imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.”).  
Reading “attempted use” to capture attempt offenses is thus 
consistent with broader federal treatment of attempt offenses.   
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  It seems abundantly clear that, by adding “attempted 
use” to the elements clause, Congress was not inviting us to 
engage in the casuistry so often associated with the categorical 
approach and to thereby read those same words out of the 
statute.  The elected lawmakers wanted to categorically include 
attempt crimes in the statutory definition, and they said so 
plainly.  Cf. Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1879 
(2019) (Cautioning that in the application of the categorical 
approach, statutes should not be interpreted in a manner that 
would eliminate most crimes of the same type from the generic 
definition selected by Congress because doing so “not only 
would defy common sense, but also would defeat Congress’[s] 
stated objective of imposing enhanced punishment …. We 
should not lightly conclude that Congress enacted a self-
defeating statute.”).  We thus follow the majority rule that 
attempted Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a crime of 
violence under § 924(c) and accordingly hold that Walker’s 
attack on his firearms conviction fails. 
 
D. Jury Instructions 
 
Although not affected by the Supreme Court’s Davis 
decision, Walker also renews his argument that the jury 
instructions in this case were insufficient because they leave 
open to doubt whether his § 924(c) conviction rested on his 
having conspired to commit Hobbs Act robbery or his having 
attempted to commit such robbery.  There is a serious argument 
that only the latter can properly serve as a predicate for a 
§ 924(c) conviction.16  That argument is immaterial now, 
 
 16 Supra note 10 (explaining that the government 
concedes that “Walker correctly observes that the government, 
and several appellate courts, have acknowledged after Davis 
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however, because the instructions made it sufficiently clear 
that the attempt was the predicate offense.   
 
The jury was instructed that, to convict Walker on the 
§924(c) count, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt:  
 
that the conspirator or the accomplice committed 
the crime of attempted interference with 
interstate commerce by robbery.  So you would 
have to find … that during and in relation to the 
commission of that attempted Hobbs Act 
robbery, the Defendant or one of his accomplices 
or conspirators knowingly used or carried a 
firearm.   
(App. at 885 (emphasis added).)  Although the word “attempt” 
was repeatedly used in the instruction and the predicate crime 
was expressly identified as “attempted Hobbs Act robbery,” 
Walker says the District Court erred in telling the jury that a 
conviction could be sustained if the “[d]efendant or one of his 
accomplices or conspirators knowingly used or carried a 
firearm.”  (Id. (emphasis added); Appellant Sept. 2019 Suppl. 
Ltr. at 5.)   
 
 We remain unpersuaded.  As the government points out, 
nothing in Davis affects our earlier case-specific conclusion 
that the District Court was clear enough when it instructed the 
jury on the attempt charge.  That suffices for affirmance. 
 
 
that a conspiracy crime is not a proper 924(c) predicate under 
the elements clause.”) (quoting Appellee Sept. 2019 Suppl. Ltr. 
at 2 (emphasis added)). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment and sentence.  
